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Abstract
It is still disputed whether foresight exercises should be based on top-expert assessments or on a
broader base of less specialised experts, and whether the self-rating of experts is an acceptable
method. Using the German 1993 and the Austrian 1998 Technology Delphis, this study addresses
both questions: Self-rating is in fact an appropriate method for selecting experts. But the assess-
ment of self-rated top-experts tend to suffer from an optimism bias, due to the experts’ involvement
and their underestimation of realisation and diffusion problems. The degree of optimism is posi-
tively correlated with the degree of self-rated knowledge, and it is more pronounced for the least
pioneering and for organisational innovations. Experts with top self-ratings working in business
have a stronger optimism bias than those working in academia or in the administration. Consistent
with the insider hypothesis, they are most optimistic with regard to realisation, innovativeness, and
potential leadership in economic exploitation. Given the optimism bias, foresight exercises should
base their panels on a fair mixture of experts of different grades, with different types of knowledge
and affiliation, and not only on top specialists of the respective field. Delphi-type exercises, there-
fore, offer an advantage relative to forum groups or small panels of specialists.
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Introduction
Whether the foresight of experts and especially self-rating experts is superior to that of others has
been under discussion since the earliest days of Delphi exercises. Adequate tests are rare, however,
so that a broad range of positions prevails. Foresight exercises based on forum groups or expert
panels implicitly assume that it pays to make use of the highest possible level of expertise. Delphi
studies, in contrast, infer that it pays to base the respective assessment or foresight on different
levels of expertise: They usually call for the self-rating of respondents, and make full use not only
of the answers from top experts but also of experts from the upper half range at least. A close ex-
amination of the Austrian Technology Delphi (ITA 1998) underlines this practise: It reveals a mar-
ked ‘optimism’ among self-rating top experts. This check cannot verify, however, whether this op-
timism is justified or not, i. e. whether the top experts give better counsel or worse than those ex-
perts who consider themselves less informed: Due to its design as a Decision Delphi, which is not
on the lookout for emerging technologies, but for technologies and/or technological market niches
harbouring a potential for Austrian leadership within the next 15 years, an evaluation cannot take
place for at least another decade. The German Technology Delphi, however, a classical Delphi
querying the time horizons for the realization of the respective innovations, provides for such a
test, and supports the hypothesis that top experts are in fact overoptimistic, clearly underestimating
the realisation and diffusion period for short and medium-term projects. Top experts working in
enterprises tend to have the most pronounced optimism bias according to the Austrian data. The
evidence from both sources combined suggests that foresight exercises should include not only top
experts of the relevant field, but also experts with a broader range of interest as well as experts with
widely differing backgrounds. And it may provide a further argument in favour of the use of Del-
phi-type investigations as an instrument of foresight, in addition to the well-known advantages of
anonymity, lack of a bias resulting from the influence of dominating personalities within the group,
and especially of the convergence of results.
The paper starts with a summary of the literature on potential sources of bias in expert assessments,
followed by a short description of the Austrian Technology Delphi in the second section. The main
part elaborates the differences between the answers of the experts in the Austrian Technology Delphi
evaluating their question-specific expertise as top (1 on an ordinal scale from 1 to 5 five), and those
rating it with 2 or 3.1 The differences in assessment among respondents of different levels of self-
rating will be analysed in terms of economic area, type of innovation (technical or organisational),
and degree of innovativeness. The fourth section examines the German Technology Delphi in order
to find out whether the favourable assessment of top experts in fact turns out to be correct, reflec-
ting the top-experts' better insight, or whether it results from over-optimism. The fifth section asks
which group of respondents (business, academia and others, mainly bureaucrats) give the most op-
timistic assessment in the Austrian Delphi. The last section provides a conclusion.
1 The answers of respondents rating their own specific knowledge with 4 or 5 were excluded as they were be-
lieved to vitiate rather than to improve the results.
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1 The role of experts in Delphi exercises
The Delphi technique was developed for use in judgement and forecasting situations where pure
model-based statistical methods were impractical or impossible. It is a procedure to “obtain the
most reliable consensus of opinion of a group of experts … by a series of intensive questionnaires
interspersed with controlled opinion feedback (Dalkey and Helmer 1963, p. 458). Top experts
were assumed to provide the best judgement and forecast. But whether this was true in general and
especially with respect to self-rated expertise was – and still is – at issue. In experimental studies,
employing students who answer almanac questions,2 RAND-researchers revealed that the answers
given by a subgroup of more knowledgeable individuals selected in terms of their self-rating are
generally not more accurate than those of the group as a whole. “On the other hand, the group reli-
ability for average self-confidence on individual questions was quite high” (Dalkey 1969, p. 68).
Since then several studies have dealt with this question, but the results are equivocal: Dalkey et al.
(1970), Dalkey and Brown (1971), Jolson and Rossow (1971), Best (1974), (1987), Larréché and
Moinpour (1983), Riggs (1983), Häder and Rexroth (1998), Geschka (1977) or Albach (1970)
tend to give judgements and forecasts from top experts more reliability, while Weaver (1971), Welty
(1972), Brockhoff (1975), or Linstone (1978) don’t see significant differences or tend even towards
the opposite, giving top experts less reliability.3
At least part of these disparate results may be due to inadequate testing procedures, which conduct
laboratory experiments with students – mostly undergraduates – answering almanac questions (Rowe
et al 1991; Rowe and Wright 1999). Putting almanac questions to students – a rather homogenous
group of non-experts with essentially similar knowledge – is very different from the true Delphi
goal of having unknown future events assessed by a diversity of experts using differing knowledge.
In all these laboratory experiments, self-rating refers to knowledge or to the ability to guess. In a
real-world Delphi, which intends to “obtain the most reliable consensus of opinion of a group of
experts” (Dalkey and Helmer 1963, p. 458), self-rating should, in contrast, refer to the ability to
assess uncertain events. What is even more important, the students in the experiments answering
almanac questions are not involved, while experts assessing future developments in their field of
activity definitely are. Some of the more specific results of the studies clearly demonstrate an in-
sider bias: the relevance of involvement, as well as the influence of involvement on assessment and
foresight. Zakay (1983) found that respondents perceive desirable/undesirable life events as more
likely to occur/not to occur to themselves than to other similar persons. Wright and Ayton (1989;
1992) discovered a positive influence of desirability on the assessment, and emphasise the signifi-
cant positive correlation of desirability with over-confidence, detected already by Ament (1970),
Milburn (1978), and Weinstein (1980). Shrum (1985) found that researchers working in a specific
field regard this very field as more innovative than those working in other fields. This optimism
bias among experts tends to be stronger in less innovative and less promising fields. Top experts
(i. e. insiders in most cases), therefore, demand a more active policy to promote their field of work
(Grupp et al. 2000, p. 61), and tend to be overoptimistic with regard to the realisation of (their) in-
novations (Grupp et al. 2000, p. 59). Menrad et al. (1999, p. 160–61) report a much more positive
2 Almanac questions are questions with uncontroversial, easily verifiable outcomes, mostly guesses about quan-
tities (e. g. tonnage of yearly shipments from New York harbour, diameter of planet Jupiter, etc.).
3 “Armstrong 1987 surveyed the literature and found that although minimal expertise in a given field would
improve the accuracy of problem solutions, clinical diagnoses, and economic forecasts, higher level of ex-
pertise resulted in diminishing returns. This led to the popular quotation: ‘Don’t hire the best expert you
can – or even close to the best: Hire the cheapest.’” (Parenté and Parenté 1987, p. 137).
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stance among German experts from industry and academia towards biotechnology than among con-
sumers and opponents, and their belief in a faster realisation (see also section 5 of this paper).4
The fragmented evidence surveyed above – in most cases based on rather small samples – appears
to suggest a tradeoff between the superior knowledge of experts and the potential optimism bias re-
sulting from the experts’ involvement. Several reasons can be found to explain the optimism-bias
among top experts: “Unrealistic optimism” (Weinstein 1980, p. 806) may result from the overesti-
mation of own capabilities and the underestimation of risks inherent in one's own work, well known
in risk research (Kahneman and Tversky 1972). In Weinstein’s (1980, p. 814) experiments students
showed the greatest optimism in relation to events perceived to be controllable and implying some
degree of commitment or emotional investment in the outcome. Perceived controllability, commit-
ment, and emotional investment are indeed typical constellations influencing an insider's points of
view. Experts pushing ahead the advance in their specific field are fascinated by their task, they
must believe in its significance and in its future. They are strongly influenced by the desirability of
the outcome (Weaver 1971), and they believe in their ability to influence it (Tyebjee 1987). Inso-
far, top experts are informed advocates of their own issue, and frequently take on a strong affilia-
tion bias (Slovic 2000a, p. xxx).5 “We find a curious ahistoricity in the outlook of most scientists
and technologists, together with a tendency for inbreeding.” (Linstone 1978, p. 298). Top experts
tend to reduce complexity by closing their eyes to the fact that the introduction of a new technology
entails a complex of innovations rather then a single technical innovation.6 Diffusion periods are
heavily underestimated especially for major innovations (Rogers 31983), implementation is assumed
to be smooth and devoid of serious obstacles (Linstone 1978, p. 295). Above all technical experts
tend to overestimate the importance of their own technical problem and dissimulate the dependence
on other technologies (Rosenberg 1994) as well as the need for organisational innovations to sup-
port the technical ones (Schnaars 1989).7 The optimism among experts is further promoted by their
assumed ability to mobilise economic, social and political resources furthering their goals (Burns
1985; Krupp 1992). Last but not least, insiders frequently overestimate their knowledge and their
competitiveness relative to their competitors: Japanese experts regarded themselves as leading in
nanotechnology, while German and French experts ranked them second after the U.S. German ex-
perts ranked themselves in front of France, while French experts ranked themselves in front of
Germany (Grupp 1999, p. 175). Academic scientists, however, appear to be less affected by this type
of bias (Corn 1986, p. 224).
This short glance at the rather sparse evaluation studies suggests that the main problem is not the
appropriateness of self-rating as a true reflector of actual expertise. It is the involvement of top ex-
perts and insiders that tends to generate overconfidence and to bias their assessment and foresight.
4 A counterexample, however, is reported by Linstone (1978, pp. 285-90): In a study on the future of medicine
commissioned by a pharmaceutical company, outsiders, i. e. extramural experts, were much more optimistic
with regard to the data of achievement than insiders, i. e. in-house experts. Similar results are reported in
section 3 for Austria.
5 “We also observed a strong ‘affiliation bias’ indicating that toxicologists who work for industry see chemicals
as more benign than do their counterparts in academia and government. Compared to other experts, indus-
trial toxicologists were somewhat more confident in the general validity of animal tests except when those
tests were said to provide evidence for carcinogenicity – in which case many of the industrial experts changed
their opinion about the tests being valid. Similar results have been found in follow-up studies in Canada
(Slovic et al 1995) and in the UK (Slovic et all 1997; see also Lynn 1987).” (Slovic 2000a, xxx). The af-
filiation prejudice is particularly strong in rather closed research areas: “It seems that the fusion research
community has adopted a strategy of ‘harmonising assumptions’ to reduce uncertainty and range of alter-
natives.” (Kalinovski 1994, p. 25).
6 “As those familiar with forecasting have learned, the specialist is not necessarily the best forecaster. He fo-
cuses on a subsystem and frequently takes no account of the larger system.” (Linstone 1975, p. 581).
7 See also section 3.
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Including less specialised experts with a broader perspective in foresight exercises may therefore
be conducive to better results. Sections 3 and 4 will test this hypothesis with the help of the Aus-
trian and the German Technology Delphi.
The optimism bias among experts with the highest knowledge – the subject of this study – must not
be confused with a potential over-optimism of long-term technology forecasts in general. Espe-
cially in the 1960s a technology optimism prevailed, particularly in popular futurism, but this
widely accepted by serious media and the educated public as well (Avison and Nettler 1976; Corn
1986; Schnaars 1989). The authors of these forecasts were generally specialised in ‘futurism’, and
it is still an open question whether experts specialised in specific technological fields were subject
to this futurist optimism bias within their own field of expertise as well (Wise 1976; Schnaars
1989, p. 83), or if they were more sceptical (Corn 1986, p. 224).
2 A brief introduction
to the Austrian Technology Delphi8
Methodologically, the Austrian Technology Delphi (ITA 1998) was designed as a Decision Del-
phi.9 This specific form was considered the appropriate tool as the goal was not to forecast new
emerging fields of technology, but to map out those fields and niches where Austria could attain a
leading position within the next 15 years – either in applied science, in economic application, or in
societal/organisational transposition. As is mandatory in the text-book Delphi (Martino 1983) – even
if rarely applied in practice – an unstructured ‘zero round’ was used, grating the experts relative
liberty to identify and elaborate on the issues they consider important – in this case promising
fields for Austrian dominance with already existing Austrian strengths. In this ‘zero round’, 350
experts (response rate 39 percent)10 were asked to answer a questionnaire with open questions (Ti-
chy und Aichholzer 1997). Combined with desk research (Tichy 1997a; 1997b; 1997c), the results
of the zero-round interrogation provided a respectable basis for selecting promising areas for the
Delphi survey. To prepare the questions and – later on – to analyse the results, special emphasis
was given to expert groups according to the bottom-up approach inherent in a Decision Delphi. In
each of the selected (seven) fields of investigation an expert group was formed, comprising scien-
tists from academia, relevant persons from businesses, administration experts, and – as far as pos-
sible – consumer representatives. The size of the expert groups varied between 14 and 23. Their
task was problem-oriented rather than focused on technological development, to avoid the frequent
trap of focusing only on new technologies urgently seeking just any application. This strategy was
based on the assumption that innovations appropriate for solving existing problems will more eas-
ily find a market in the future than purely technical ones.
  8 For a more detailed description in English see Aichholzer 2001 a, b, or Tichy 2001a.
  9 Rauch (1979) distinguishes three types of Delphi studies: (1) The Classical Delphi as a tool to discover the
group opinion of experts about future facts. It ensures that the future evolves according to some law or at
least some regularity. (2) The Policy Delphi as a tool to clarify the positions of decision-makers. It deals
with ideas and concepts, not with data and facts. (3) The Decision Delphi, a tool to co-ordinate decisions
with relevance to the future, if the future does not follow a law but is influenced by a large number of
small, uncoordinated decisions (the “tyranny of small decisions”). In a Decision Delphi, reality is not pre-
dicted or described, it is made. Its main social function is to co-ordinate and structure the general lines of
thought in diffuse and unexplored fields of social relations and to transform future development in such an
area from mere accident to the result of carefully considered decisions.
10 Among which 17 % entrepreneurs, 23 % physical scientists, 16 % technicians, 13 % social scientists, 19 %
civil servants.
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The task of each expert group was to formulate some 40 hypotheses within their specific field, with
regard to a situation 15 years hence.11 For any one of these 40 hypotheses within the 7 fields, the
respective respondents in the two Delphi rounds had to answer questions about their specific
knowledge, the innovativeness implied in the respective hypothesis, the importance of the hypothe-
sis, its chance of realisation in Austria in general, and the probability of Austrian dominance with
respect to R&D, economic exploitation as well as organisational-social implementation. In addi-
tion, the panellists were asked to assess the indicated development as desirable or undesirable, and
which policy measures – out of a given list – they considered to be appropriate to enforce the en-
visaged development. Room for comments was provided. The respondents for each one of the seven
fields were selected according to their expertise and an planned composition of the sample, in-
tending to comprise academia, businesses, and a group comprising administration and several groups
of lobbyists (including NGOs) in equal parts.
As usual the Austrian Delphi comprised two rounds: 3,748 questionnaires were mailed in the first
and 1,597 in the second round, of which a formidable 46 percent and 71 percent were returned. Out
of the respondents in the second round, some 35 percent were employed in businesses, 25 percent
in academia, 17 percent in administration, 7 percent in lobbies, and 16 percent elsewhere. Func-
tionally, one third worked in R&D, one fifth in market-related jobs, one eighth indicated a combi-
nation of several functions. Women were heavily underrepresented while the age structure was rep-
resentative (ITA 1998, vol. 1, p. 74).
The Austrian foresight exercise in the form of a Technology-Delphi proved highly successful. The
expert groups did a perfect job in elaborating the questions and proved helpful in evaluating the re-
sults. The response rate in the two rounds was extremely high – considering the length of the ques-
tionnaire of about 40 pages –, the knowledge of the respondents was very good, and the answers
highly consistent. In total, 14 percent of the respondents indicated a very high and 29 percent a
high knowledge12 with respect to the relevant hypothesis, 81 percent considered the questionnaires’
hypotheses to be very important or important, 92 percent as desirable. The innovativeness of the
products and processes addressed by the questions was given a mark of 2.2 (on a scale decreasing
from 1 to 5), realisation in Austria a mark of 2.6. 52 percent of the respondents expected good
chances for technological as well as for economic dominance of Austria in realising the relevant
innovations, 62 percent expected good chances with respect to social-organisational transposition.
The study (ITA 1998, vol. 2, pp. 277-99) revealed several problem-oriented fields of potential
leadership for Austrian scientists (R&D-dominance) and businesses (economic dominance). Classi-
fying the Delphi results according to standard industry classifications helped find an explanation
for the Old structures/High performance paradox (Tichy 2001b), i. e. the contrast between Aus-
tria’s old structures and its rather good economic performance. It revealed that Austrian experts
awarded top marks for innovativeness to low- and high qualification as well as to mainstream and
research-intensive industries, not to medium qualification and to marketing and labour-intensive
ones. This implies that innovation in Austria is by no means restricted to high-tech industries, and
that the standard industry classification is not suited to deal with aspects of technology policy.
11 E. g. “Simulation-software for virtual optimisation of vehicles and their components with respect to weight,
safety, and emissions will be developed.”
12 Marks 1 and 2 respectively on a 5 point Lickert scale.
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3 ‘Top-Expert Optimism’
in the Austrian Technology Delphi
In the Austrian Technology Delphi – as in any Delphi – the questionnaires were sent to persons
considered to be experts, i. e. persons with specific knowledge in the relevant field, who have been
accepted by the scientific community, and have an influence on other actors in the respective field
(Bogner und Menz 2001, p. 486). The design of the Austrian Delphi intended to have representa-
tives of academia, businesses,13 and others (civil servants, consumers, lobbyists, etc. – ‘administra-
tion’ in short) roughly equally represented among the respondents. At the end of the day, i. e. in the
second round, however, ‘others’(40 percent) and ‘business’ (35 percent) were somewhat over-
represented, at the cost of ‘academia’ (25 percent). The respondents were asked to indicate their
specific knowledge using an ordinal five point scale of integers (Lickert scale)14 for each hypothe-
sis in the questionnaire. As presented in ITA (1998, vol. 1, p. 89), the Austrian Technology Delphi
made full use of the answers provided by all experts with a self-rating of 1 to 3 for the respective
question. This is in accordance with the state of the art (cf. e. g. Cuhls et al 1998, p. 10). In general,
the self-appraisal differed more among the fields than among the occupations (see table 1).
Table 1: Knowledge as revealed by self-rating (round 2: N = 1127)
Business Academia Others Total
BE 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.5
BW 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.5
LL 2.5 2.2 2.3 2.3
MZ 2.9 3.0 2.6 2.8
UP 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.0
VK 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.1
WK 3.1 3.0 - 3.1
Average 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.7
Arithmetic means; differences due to rounding
Abbreviations see table 2
13 Distinguishing criterion is the place of work, indicating their primary interest: Researchers working in in-
dustry therefore fall into the category ‘business’.
14 This implies that ‘top experts’ had to fulfil two criteria: firstly, they had to be selected as experts in the
specific Delphi field, and, secondly, they had to rate their own knowledge with regard to a specific ques-
tion with ‘1’ using a five-point scale.
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Table 2: Share of grades 1 and 2 among expert groups
IN WI RE FE OG WV
Exp. 1* Exp. 2+3* Exp. 1 Exp. 2+3 Exp. 1 Exp. 2+3 Exp. 1 Exp. 2+3 Exp. 1 Exp. 2+3 Exp. 1 Exp. 2+3
BE 72 68 85 83 58 46 58 48 71 60 65 55
BW 76 75 91 84 57 43 54 53 68 57 60 51
LL 79 73 89 80 41 31 45 33 81 80 38 32
MZ 67 56 83 81 58 46 57 47 72 73 50 40
VP 62 53 77 74 57 51 60 55 55 46 70 66
VK 79 68 89 82 64 47 72 63 63 52 60 51
WK 86 66 90 76 81 55 94 88 35 18 85 78
* Level of expertise 1 and 2+3, respectively, according to self-rating
IN: Innovativeness
WI: Importance
RE: Chance of Economic Realisation
FE: Chance of Austrian dominance with respect to R&D
OG: Chance of Austrian dominance with respect to organisational transposition
WV: Chance of Austrian dominance with respect economic exploitation
BE: Production and processing of organic food
BW: Environm. sound construction & new forms of housing
LL: Life-long learning
MZ: Medical technology & support for elderly people
UP: Clean and sustainable production
VK: Physical mobility
WK: Characteristics-defined materials
A closer look at the data quickly revealed that the group of ‘experts’ selected for analysis (1 to 3 on
the five point scale) was not at all homogenous. The experts who rated themselves highest (grade 1
– ‘top experts’ or ‘experts 1’) tended to be overconfident by assessing most questions more positi-
vely than the rest. Table 2 gives a first impression of this optimism bias: Experts with top self-
ratings gave many more top marks (1 or 2 on a five point Lickert scale) to the hypotheses than ex-
perts with a self-rating of 2 and 3; in all fields and in all types of questions. There was only one tiny
exception: the chance of Austrian dominance with regard to Organisational Transposition (OG) in
the field Physical Mobility (VK) received marginally lower marks by top experts. Figure 1 visuali-
ses top-expert optimism by plotting the differences among the shares of top grades given by ex-
perts 1 and experts 2+3 respectively: On average the share of top grades (1 or 2) given by experts 1
is about ten percent higher than those of experts 2+3. The optimism among top experts appears to
be highest in the technology-dominated field of Characteristics-defined Materials (WK) with re-
spect to Innovativeness (IN), Importance (WI), Chance of Realisation (RE), and of Austrian Do-
minance with regard to Organisational Transposition (OG). It is slightly less in the second prima-
rily technical field: Physical Mobility, primarily concerning the Chance of Realisation and Chance
of Austrian Dominance with regard to Organisational Transposition. In general, the optimism bias
among experts appears to be most articulate with regard to Realisation (except in Medical Tech-
nology) followed, with quite a lag, by optimism in Organisational Transposition and Innovative-
ness.
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Source: Table 2: Differences between columns ‘experts 1’ and ‘experts 2+3’.
Figure 1: Differences in the share of top grades among ‘experts 1’ and ‘experts 2+3’
The ranking order changes when the analysis is restricted to the significant differences. One fifth of
the differences between the marks of experts 1 and experts 2+3 is significant at the 90 percent level,
one eighth at the 95 percent level. Given the wide range of evaluations – a quite normal and desired
quality of Delphi responses – this strongly supports the existence of expert optimism. Lifelong
Learning instead of Characteristics-defined Materials now appears as the field with most pronounced
expert optimism.15 The significant differences are strongly correlated with the degree of (self-rated)
knowledge, except for Physical Mobility, which ranks second in optimism but – together with
Characteristics-defined Materials – last in knowledge.
The rest of this section concentrates on analysing the significant differences. As to the fields of the
Delphi exercise, top-expert optimism is most pronounced in Lifelong Learning and Physical Mo-
bility (see table 3), least in Clean and Sustainable Production and – contrary to the overall data – in
Characteristics-defined Materials.16 For Physical Mobility the share of top grades (1 and 2) given
by top experts was significantly higher for 49 (95 percent significance) and 68 (90 percent signifi-
cance) of the 246 answers, i. e. in 20 percent and 28 percent of all the answers, for Lifelong
Learning in 17 percent and 30 percent. For Clean and Sustainable Production the figures fall to a
still remarkable 8 percent and 15 percent.
15 See footnote 16.
16 An explanation could be that very specific technical questions prevail in characteristics-defined materials,
so that for all questions a fraction of the respondents considered themselves less knowledgeable, which re-
duced the number of significant differences.
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Table 3: Expert optimism according to fields and topics*
IN WI RE FE OG WV Average
BE 7/12 % 7/12 % 20/27 % 10/17 % 10/20 % 17/27 % 12/19 %
BW 10/10 % 14/14 % 29/33 % 7/12 % 7/26 % 17/36 % 14/18 %
LL 13/23 % 20/47 % 17/37 % 37/43 % 0/17 % 3/13 % 17/30 %
MZ 14/19 % 8/14 % 25/39 % 3/3 % 11/14 % 6/14 % 11/17 %
UP 11/17 % 9/9 % 11/26 % 9/20 % 9/14% 0/6 % 8/15 %
VK 20/27 % 17/29 % 32/41 % 22/29 % 10/12 % 20/22 % 20/28 %
WK 14/19 % 5/14 % 19/19 % – 14/14 % 2/19 % 9/15 %
Average 13/18 % 11/19 % 23/31 % 12/17 % 9/17 % 10/20 % 12/20 %
* Percentage difference between the share of top grades among expert 1 and experts 2+3,
significant at the 5/10 percent level).
Abbreviations see table 2
Among the topics of the Delphi exercise, top experts were most optimistic with regard to the Chance
of Realisation (23 and 31 percent; see table 3) and least optimistic with regard to the Chance of
Austrian Dominance with regard to Organisational Transposition (9 and 17 percent). When taking a
closer look, expert optimism is most pronounced in Physical Mobility and Environmentally Sound
Construction as to Chance of Realisation, and in Lifelong Learning as to Importance and Chance of
Austrian Dominance with regard to R&D.
It is not easy to detect a comprehensible pattern in the fields in which expert optimism dominates:
Life-long Learning and Physical Mobility have little in common. Much more sense can be found in
the answers to the topics of the questions: Top experts are much more optimistic than others with
regard to the Chance of Realisation of the respective innovation, i. e. in most cases the innovation
they are working on, and they are least optimistic the Chance of Austrian Dominance with regard
to Organisational Transposition in the respective field, which may be beyond their control.
Further evidence can be gained by distinguishing between the types of innovation. The Austrian
Technology Delphi differentiated between technological, mixed, and organisational innovation on
the one hand, and three stages of innovativeness on the other.17 According to table 4, the optimism
bias among top-experts is by far the strongest in terms of organisational innovations, especially in
the fields of Life-long Learning and Physical Mobility. It is important to emphasise that enthusiasm
is greater for minor innovations (“In general use within 15 years”) than for major ones in all fields,
i. e. for those with a longer horizon of realisation. This could reflect the pessimism among respon-
dents regarding Austrian innovativeness.18 It is, however, in concordance with the results of the
German Delphi, in which expert optimism appears to be restricted to the short and medium run as
well (see section 4), and with at least part of the literature: Shrum (1985) underlines that the opti-
mism bias with respect to innovativeness is stronger in less innovative and less promising fields.19
17 The most advanced is “Developed within 15 years”, the medium is “Available within 15 years”, and “In gen-
eral use within 15 years” is the least innovative.
18 For further evidence see Tichy 2001b.
19 It contradicts Corn’s (1996) hypothesis of the innovators’ underestimation of the diffusion process, which,
however, appears to refer to radical systemic innovations.
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Table 4: Expert optimism according to field and type of innovation*
T M O E A V Average
BE 10/12 % 13/17 % 12/23 % 11/11 % 13/27 % 16/23 % 12/19 %
BW 19/26 % 13/24 % 9/16 % 8/17 % 15/20 % 15/23 % 14/18 %
LL – 14/28 % 19/31 % – 20/30 % 16/30 % 17/30 %
MZ 7/12 % – 16/21 % 4/6 % 11/15 % 8/14 % 11/17 %
UP 8/15 % – 10/13 % – 5/12 % 9/17 % 8/15 %
VK 11/16 % – 36/46 % 6/11 % 24/32 % 26/33 % 20/28 %
WK 8/13 % (50/50 %)** (17/33 %)** 3/3 % 13/20 % 7/14 % 9/15 %
Average 9/15 % 8/14 % 18/27 % 6/10 % 10/15 % 17/27 % 12/20 %
* Percentage difference between the share of expert 1 marks significantly (5/10 percent level) more positive
than those of experts 2+3
**  Small numbers
T: Technical innovation E: Developed within 15 years
M: Mixed A: Available within 15 years
O: Organisational innovation V: In general use within 15 years
It is less obvious, however, why people who self-rated themselves as top experts are more optimis-
tic than other experts when assessing organisational rather than technical innovations. This appears
to be in contrast to their weak optimism with regard to the potential Austrian Dominance in Or-
ganisational Transposition. It is, however, strongly confirmed by the data (see table 5): Expert op-
timism is weaker for technical questions in all topics except Chance of Austrian Dominance in Or-
ganisational Transposition.
Table 5: Technical versus organisational questions*
IN WI RE FE OG WV
Technical 14 % 12 % 26 % 8 % 19 % 15 %
Organisational 27 % 27 % 36 % 27 % 12 % 25 %
* Percentage difference between the share of expert 1 marks significantly (10 percent level) more positive
than those of experts 2+3.
Abbreviations see table 2.
It is interesting to note that the optimism among top experts refers more to the hypotheses per se
than to the specific topics: If top experts are over-optimistic (compared to the less specialised ex-
perts) with respect to one hypothesis, this frequently implies that they are over-optimistic with re-
spect to several of its topics. For 16 of the 271 Delphi hypotheses top experts expressed their opti-
mism for at least four of the six possible topics simultaneously. The most frequent combinations
were:
• Innovativeness + Importance + Chance of Realisation + Austrian Dominance in R&D (5 times);
• Importance + Chance of Realisation + Austrian Dominance in R&D + in Economic Exploitation (4);
• Importance + Chance of realisation + Austrian dominance in Org. Transpos. + in Ec. Exploita-
tion (3).
Ten of these cumulations affected organisational questions (O), twelve belonged to the least inno-
vative category (V), and eight were organisational questions dealing with less innovative subjects
(OV questions), confirming that top expert optimism refers primarily to the least innovative and to
organisational hypotheses.
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4 ‘Optimism’ in the
German Technology Delphi of 1993
The task of the Austrian Technology Delphi was to assess the degree of innovativeness, the im-
portance, and the chance of realisation of various technical and organisational innovations, as well
as the chance of Austrian dominance with regard to R&D, economic application, and organisa-
tional-social implementation. Section 3 demonstrated that the Austrian (self-rated) top experts tend
to give more optimistic answers to almost all questions than the other experts. The optimism bias
among top experts was discovered to be especially strong in terms of Physical Mobility and Life-
long Learning, Chance of Realisation, and for organisational and less innovative hypotheses. The
type of questions in the Austrian Delphi and the time horizon of 15 years give little chance, how-
ever, to figure out, whether the top experts’ ‘optimistic’ answers reflect better knowledge and will
prove true in the future, or if an unjustified optimism bias prevails. The German Delphi (BMFT
1993) provides the chance of a test: As a classical Delphi, it asked for the time horizons required to
realise the respective innovations. Since a decade has passed in the meantime, at least some evi-
dence can be gained on whether the optimism among top experts exists in Germany as well as in
Austria, and whether it turns out to be justified.
Table 6: Expert optimism in the German Technology Delphi
Occurrence as to top experts’ assessment (%)
earlier same time later no indication
Medicine 52 17 19 13
Communication 51 38 11 0
Agriculture and fishery 51 37 12 0
Aerospace 47 43 9 5
Maritime & Geoscience 43 28 6 23
Materials 41 22 19 19
Biotechnology 39 30 26 4
Society & culture 38 20 16 26
Electronics & information 36 27 18 21
Raw mat.& water resources 36 10 38 15
Atomic energy 35 35 20 10
Energy 29 33 38 0
Ecology 26 36 30 8
Production 25 19 28 28
Transportation 24 34 23 19
Construction 17 32 46 5
Average 38 28 21 14
In the German Delphi, respondents were asked to indicate their specific knowledge on an ordinal four
point scale of integers (high – medium – low – alien to the field). Results are published separately for
knowledge high + medium + low, and for top experts (evidently ‘high knowledge’). Table 6 indicates
results that are very similar to the Austrian ones: top experts expected the realisation of innovations to
14 ________________________________________________________________________  Gunther Tichy
manu:script (ITA-02-05) _________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
be earlier than the group as a whole (including top experts!)20 for 38 percent of the questions, a later
realisation for 21 percent only. Medicine, Communication, and Agriculture & Fishery are the fields with
the greatest expert optimism, Production, Transportation, and Construction those with the lowest.
Table 7: Top-experts assessment for short and
medium term topicsNumber of questions for
which top experts expect earlier/later realisation
earlier/later
Medicine 52/4
Communication 33/4
Agriculture & Fishery 33/5
Aerospace 17/2
Maritime & Geoscience 34/2
Materials 42/5
Biotechnology 34/2
Society & Culture 31/4
Electronics & Information 31/0
Raw mat.&Water Resources 14/3
Atomic energy 13/1
Energy 12/1
Ecology 12/1
Production 18/1
Transportation 13/3
Construction 11/10
Total 400/48
An evaluation of the accuracy of expert optimism is possible for innovations where forecasts be-
lieved that realisation would be in the periods “before 1995”, “1996–2000” and “2001–2005”.21
As the questions were answered in 1992, this implies an analysis restricted to forecasts for ten
years or less, i. e. to the short and medium term aspects. According to table 7, top-expert optimism
is much greater for this shorter horizon. Medicine remains the field with the most pronounced top-
expert optimism for short and medium range innovations as well, followed by Materials, Maritime
& Geoscience, and Biotechnology. Communication and Agriculture & Fishery show less top-expert
optimism in the short and medium run. The fact that top-expert optimism is much stronger for the
shorter horizon (table 7) than on average (table 6) implies less top expert optimism or even top-
expert pessimism for innovations with a longer horizon. This is in full accordance with the Aus-
trian results, but at variance with the conclusions of Corn (1986) or Schnaars (1989) cited in sec-
tion 1. As both authors investigate mainly long-term ‘futuristic’ forecasts of the 1960s, two expla-
nations are possible: That the ‘futuristic’ forecasts generally tend more towards optimism, or that
technological optimism was typical for the 1960s but not for the late 1990s. Indications exists for
both explanations, but are not the subject of this study.
20 Note that the difference would be even greater if it were possible to compare the answers of experts 1 with
those of experts 2+3 as in the Austrian case. The published data, however, do not allow a more detailed
analysis.
21 Innovations where forecast believed that realisation would be in the on-going period 2001–2005 were in-
cluded as they should be at least partly realised.
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To analyse the accuracy of the optimism in the assessments of the German Delphi, 19 experts were
asked to assess for this study whether the specific innovations in 10 of the 16 fields of the German
Delphi have now (July 2002) been realised, partially realised, or not realised. Seven experts did not
reply or their answers were late so that their replies could not be included. Table 8 gives the per-
centage of the optimistic top experts in the German Delphi whose optimism proved accurate, par-
tially accurate, or wrong. On average, in only 20 percent of the cases where top experts foresaw an
earlier realisation than the whole group of experts (including top experts!) their optimism proved
fully and in 45 percent at least partially accurate. In 33 percent it was wrong. The German data,
therefore, suggest the existence of (unjustified) expert optimism, even if the degree differs widely
among the fields. It is most marked in Electronics & Information and in Transport, but rather high
in Biotechnology and Medicine as well, i. e. in quickly expanding fields. Unjustified expert opti-
mism is least marked in Energy and Atomic energy. Both observations contrast statements of Shrum
(1985), who accentuates a stronger expert-optimism bias in less innovative and less promising fields.
No correlation exists between the degree of top-expert optimism in the various fields (table 6) and
the respective accuracy of the assessment (table 8).
Table 8: Accuracy of top-expert medium-run optimistic assessment
Percent of optimistic top experts being
accurate partially acc. wrong
Aerospace 46 % 31 % 23 %
Energy 40 % 50 % 10 %
Atomic energy 31 % 54 % 15 %
Communication 30 % 40 % 30 %
Ecology 28 % 39 % 33 %
Materials 21 % 42 % 36 %
Electronics & information 20 % 20 % 60 %
Biotechnology 11 % 48 % 41 %
Medicine 2 % 53 % 44 %
Transport 0 % 50 % 50 %
Average 20 % 45 % 33 %
5 Who is optimistic?
In both the Austrian and the German Technology Delphi, top experts definitely gave more positive
answers than those experts who rated themselves as somewhat less knowledgeable. The German
Delphi reveals that this optimism among top experts is to a considerable part unjustified, at least
with regard to the period of realisation, indicating a distinct optimism bias. As foresight exercises
increasingly gain significance in policy formulation, particularly in industry and technology policy,
it is important to examine the reasons for this bias. The Austrian Technology Delphi offers a chance
to analyse at least two aspects:
• Which groups of experts appear to be most affected by an optimism bias, on the one hand, as it
distinguishes among experts coming from academia, business, and other occupations, mostly ad-
ministration.
16 ________________________________________________________________________  Gunther Tichy
manu:script (ITA-02-05) _________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
• And, on the other hand, which topics are most affected by an optimism bias, as it asked ques-
tions on the innovativeness implied by the respective hypothesis, the importance of the hypothe-
sis, its chance of realisation in Austria in general, and the chance of Austrian dominance with re-
spect to R&D, economic exploitation as well as organisational-societal implementation.
The method applied in this section is similar to that of section 3: The relevant statistic is the per-
centage-point difference between the share of top experts and the share of experts 2+3 giving
marks 1 or 2 to the respective topics. The only difference is that in this chapter all the differences
are analysed, while section 3 concentrated merely on the significant ones.22 Averaging the differ-
ences of all topics (IN, WI, RE, FE, OG, WV) raised in the questions on each hypothesis (figure 2)
clearly indicates that the top experts coming from the business sector are the ones most tempted to
give unjustified optimistic assessments.23 They are more optimistic than the less specialised busi-
ness experts in each one of the seven fields, and their optimism is more pronounced than the opti-
mism of top experts coming from academia or administration in six of the seven fields. The only
exception is medicine, a field characterised by excessive optimism among academic top experts.
This is not unexpected, as in a study on the future of medicine commissioned by a pharmaceutical
company (Linstone 1978, pp. 285-90), outsiders, i. e. non-business experts, were likewise much
more optimistic with respect to achievement than insiders, i. e. in-house (business)experts.
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0,0
5,0
10,0
15,0
20,0
BE BW LL MZ UP VK WK
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Business
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Abbreviations see table 2
Source: Table 9: Average of rows IN, WI, RE, FE, OG, and WV.
Figure 2: Indication of expert optimism according to field
22 This comes from the fact that the number of responses in most of the cross classifications is smaller, and
implies a less detailed analysis and less stringent conclusions.
23 This may appear strange at first but is confirmed by recent evidence of over-optimistic entrepreneurs with
regard to their confidence in the swift success of UMTS, the prospects of the New Economy in general, or
of quick profits in the biotech business.
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The over-optimism of top experts coming from administration and academia is markedly less pro-
nounced than that of business experts. In administration, top experts are even less optimistic than
experts 2+3 in the field of Clean and sustainable production, and in academia top experts are less
optimistic in the fields Clean and sustainable production and Physical mobility.
With regard to the fields, top-expert optimism is relatively most pronounced
• in Production & processing of organic food and Lifelong learning for experts in business,
• in Physical mobility and Environmentally sound construction & new forms of housing for ex-
perts working in the administration,
• and in Production & processing of organic food and Environmentally sound construction & new
forms of housing for experts working in academia.
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15
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Business Administration Academia
WÜ means Social Desirability:
Other abbreviations see table 2.
Source: Table 9
Figure 3: Indication of top expert optimism according to topic
The optimism bias of top experts in business does not only comprise all the fields (excluding medi-
cine), it clearly appears in all the topics as well (see figure 3). Top business experts are more opti-
mistic than 2+3-business experts regarding the Importance of the respective hypothesis, its Innova-
tiveness and as with regard to the Chance of Austrian dominance with regard to R&D, as well as
Organisational-social implementation. They are even more optimistic (difference more than 10 per-
centage points) in terms of the Innovativeness of the respective hypotheses, its Chance of realisation
in Austria in general, and the Chance of Austrian dominance with regard to Economic application.
Top experts in administration are least inclined to an optimism bias. They even have a pessimism
bias compared to their less knowledgeable fellows with regard to Innovativeness and potential Aus-
trian R&D-Leadership, and their optimism bias is the smallest in terms of Importance, Austrian
Dominance with regard to Organisational-social implementation, and the Chance of Austrian domi-
nance with regard to Economic application.
It is interesting to note, but difficult to explain, that the top experts from all occupations, even from
the business sector do not reveal any more optimism bias with regard to the Desirability (WÜ) of
the respective innovations (most of the right bars in figure 3) than their less knowledgeable fellows.
The top experts in the ``administration“ group are even significantly more pessimistic, which may
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be explained by the fact that they include representatives of NGOs and consumer organisations.
Anyhow, top experts in administration appear to be rather consistent in this specific aspect, as they
are least optimistic, relatively, in terms of all other topics as well. The top experts from business
and academia, however, consider the respective innovations to be more innovative and more im-
portant than experts 2+3, yet undesirable, which appears to be a paradox indeed. Probably some
element of technological euphoria, and an element of belief in continuous technical progress as an
unavoidable precondition of corporate and national competitiveness marks the view of these ex-
perts, which they, nevertheless, consider to be a limited contribution to human welfare.
Table 9: Expert optimism according to group of respondents
IN WI RE FE OG WV WÜ
BE F 3.7 4.3 16.2 10.0 3.1 16.1 1.8
U 19.4 6.1 18.1 17.4 13.0 20.7 2.6
A -8.3 1.3 11.0 3.5 -1.4 6.1 -3.3
BW F 0.8 6.8 9.9 6.9 17.1 8.4 2.1
U 2.6 8.8 14.3 6.4 12.5 13.1 3.6
A 3.5 2.6 24.2 -6.4 20.6 4.0 -7.7
LL F 5.0 10.5 9.1 6.7 2.3 5.8 2.4
U 15.5 13.5 8.3 22.2 -1.8 27.0 2.6
A -1.3 3.6 11.6 7.5 0.1 2.4 1.5
MZ F 16.7 0.0 6.7 -0.3 -1.0 8.5 -4.8
U 11.8 2.9 11.6 -0.9 -3.5 -3.3 -4.1
A -0.5 9.7 12.4 -20.3 -5.9 12.2 -13.5
UP F -1.1 -5.4 -4.7 -4.0 3.1 1.9 -6.5
U 6.2 3.0 9.4 4.8 7.3 4.9 -5.0
A -2.6 -11.8 -5.7 -18.9 9.2 -19.8 -23.5
VK F 5.1 -4.2 7.1 -4.9 -0.4 -6.5 -16.5
U 13.2 9.9 21.2 11.2 3.8 12.3 1.7
V A -0.3 -2.1 24.3 1.6 17.6 12.7 -5.5
WK F 13.7 6.7 19.6 -1.3 0.3 0.9 0.6
U 9.4 9.7 13.6 -1.3 20.5 4.7 -3.6
A . . . . . . .
* Percentage difference between the share of expert 1top grades and those of experts 2+3.
WÜ means Social Desirability: Other abbreviations see table 2.
The cross classification in table 9 suggests some clustering of the optimism bias among top business
experts in terms of Innovativeness, Realisation, and Austrian Realisation dominance in production
& processing of Organic food (BE), Lifelong learning (LL), and Physical mobility (VK). The op-
timism bias among top experts from administration refers to Realisation and Austrian dominance in
Organisational transposition and Economic exploitation in Lifelong learning (LL) and Physical mo-
bility (VK). While no pattern of optimism bias among academia’s top experts can be detected, the
former two clusters tend to underline the insider hypothesis.
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6 Some conclusions and suggestions
Experts with the highest self-rating of their specific knowledge tended to give the most positive as-
sessments to almost all topics raised in the Austrian Technology Delphi. The degree of optimism is
positively correlated with the degree of self-rated knowledge, and it is more pronounced for the
least pioneering innovations. On the one hand, an examination of the German Technology Delphi
discovered the same top-expert optimism with regard to the short and medium-term realisation of
innovations, while on the other hand, expert pessimism may prevail in the long run, i. e. for emer-
gent technologies. Control calculations with regard to the hypotheses of the German Delphi that
should have been realised in the meantime, revealed that the larger part of the German optimism is
unjustified to the extent that the optimistic experts clearly tended to underestimate the period of re-
alisation.
These results are important as they shed some new light on two controversial issues raised in the
methodological literature on foresight: Are the assessments of highly specialised top experts pref-
erable to those of less specialised experts in foresight exercises, and is self-rating an appropriate
method to select experts. The new facts revealed by this study tend to answer both questions in the
positive, yet not without some qualifications. As the nature of the potential qualifications depends
on the causes for the optimism among top experts, attempts were made to dig somewhat deeper
into the potential arguments.
As opposed to some of the pertinent literature (Shrum 1985), the field of investigation does not ap-
pear to be essential for top expert optimism. Neither more technical, nor high-tech, nor fast growing
fields are characterised by more top-expert optimism than others. Generally, the same holds true for
the topics of the hypotheses, even if questions referring to the possibility of realisation tend to raise
slightly more top-expert optimism than those referring to, say, potential Austrian leadership in R&D.24
More relevant is the type of hypothesis: The answers to hypotheses of an organisational nature
were much more optimistic than to hypotheses of a technological nature. This is in agreement with
previous studies maintaining that the respondents tend to neglect – or at least underestimate – diffi-
culties that lie beyond their own field of work, even if these are key to success (Linstone 1978;
Schnaars 1989; Rosenberg 1994). And organisational aspects are typically beyond the single respon-
dent’s influence. The main explanation for differences in expert optimism appear to be their occu-
pational affiliation. Delphi respondents with a top self-rating who work in business have a much
greater optimism bias than those working in academia and in particular those working in the ad-
ministration. The over-optimism of people working in business – to a large extent involved in R&D
– is evidently consistent with the insider hypothesis, stressing the overestimation of subjects a re-
searcher is working on (Ament 1980; Weinstein 1980; Wrigth and Ayton 1992). Their strongest op-
timism bias is expressed with regard to the Chance of realisation, to Innovativeness, and to the Po-
tential Austrian leadership in Economic exploitation. The insider hypothesis can help to explain the
over-optimism among experts in academia as well. It is consistent with the observation that their
greatest over-estimation applies to the Chance of realisation and Innovativeness. It is, however, not
clear why the over-optimism among experts is generally weaker in academia than in business.
Given the over-optimism among top experts in general and among insiders in particular, foresight ex-
ercises should base their panels on a fair mixture of experts of different grades, with different types
of knowledge and affiliation, and not only on top specialists of the respective field. The same consid-
eration implies that Delphi-type exercises offer an advantage over forum groups or small panels of
specialists. But even in Delphi exercises the interpretation of the results should take the insider bias
into account. Otherwise the forecast exercise is likely to bring assessments that are too optimistic.
24 Don’t forget that the tests refer to the difference between the optimism of top experts and ‘normal’ experts.
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